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CASE
NOTE
FederalExpress Corporationv. United States Postal
Service: You can Sue the Post Office
by Hala Souman and Sean McMurrough

In Federal Express Corp. v. U.S. Postal
Svs.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the United States Postal
Service's ("USPS") motion to dismiss,
which claimed immunity under the
Lanham Act 2 from a false advertising
lawsuit. The court reviewed the district
court's disposition of USPS's motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, de novo. The Sixth Circuit
ruled that: (1) the Postal
Reorganization Act's ("PRA")
incorporation of the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA") did not prevent
tort claims which were not encompassed
by the FTCA from being brought
against USPS; and (2) that, under the
Lanham Act section allowing false
advertising
claims, the USPS was a
'
iperson.3
Congress Creates USPS as a
Hybrid of a Federal Agency and a
Commercial Enterprise
In 1970, Congress, via the PRA,
legislatively dissolved the United States
Post Office Department and created
the USPS. While Congress allowed the
USPS to retain some of the
characteristics of a federal agency, it
also "invested this hybrid entity with
1998

the 'status of a private commercial
enterprise'. 4 With its new commercial
mission, the PRA granted various
powers to the USPS, among which
includes the authority "to sue and be
sued in its official name."5 The Supreme
Court in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer6 interpreted this clause as a
presumption of waiving sovereign
immunity. Thus, in the absence of any
proof indicating Congress's intention
to insulate the USPS from private
lawsuits, the USPS should be treated as
any other business that is a party to a
lawsuit.
The purpose of this hybrid entity
was to promote efficiency. Subsequently,
the commercial courier market opened
its doors to private competition.
Although the USPS holds a monopoly
over the delivery of ordinary letters, a
postal regulation allows private
commercial couriers, like Federal
Express ("FedEx"), to deliver "extremely
urgent letters."7 Because of increased
competition, in 1995 the USPS has
launched a massive advertising
campaign to increase its share of the
expedited delivery market. The content
of those advertisements became the
basis for FedEx's claim against the
USPS.

Loyola Consumer Law Review * 65

FedEx Claims USPS's Ad
Campaign Is False and Misleading
FedEx charged the USPS with false
and misleading advertising and unfair
competition on the supposed advantages
provided by the USPS's "Priority Mail"
and "Global Priority Mail" services,
compared to the "FedEx 2Day" service. 8
FedEx claimed that, although the USPS
offers its priority mail services at a
reduced cost, the USPS's quality of
services were not comparable to those
offered by FedEx. 9 On the contrary,
FedEx alleged that its delivery services
include guarantees that USPS does not
offer. For example, Plaintiff complained
that, unlike the USPS, its company
tracks all shipped packages and offers
a money-back guarantee for packages
not arriving within the promised
time. 10 Therefore, FedEx, under the
Lanham Act, sought immediate cessation
of the USPS's false and deceptive
advertising campaign, an injunction for
future misleading advertising,
monetary damages, and other relief."

USPS Insists That Court Lacks
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The district court rejected the
USPS's motion to dismiss FedEx's
claim that USPS had allegedly violated
the Lanham Act 12 for disseminating
false and misleading advertisements.
The USPS, in support of its motion,
expressed two alternate theories for
the court's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. First, the USPS claimed
immunity from federal tort lawsuits
13
due to the incorporation of the FTCA.
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Second, the USPS argued that the
Lanham Act does not apply to it
because it is not a "person" as defined
by the Act.' 4 Further, the USPS
challenged the district court's edict,
which stated that when "Congress
statutorily waived the Postal Service's
traditional sovereign immunization
against lawsuits including federal tort
actions," the USPS became a "federal
instrumentality capable of being
sued."' 5
Federal courts have jurisdiction over
suits against a federal agency only if
the United States has waived its
sovereign immunity by consenting to
be sued. Ultimately, the USPS argued
that Congress' incorporation of the
FTCA into the PRA immunized the
USPS from causes of action under the
Lanham Act regardless of the "sue and
be sued" clause.
USPS Claims Immunization From
Lanham Act Litigation Regardless
of "Sue and Be Sued" Proviso
The USPS argued that Congress'
incorporation of the FTCA into the
PRA mandates postal immunization
from Lanham Act litigation,
irrespective of the PRA's "sue and be
sued" clause.' 6 The USPS maintained
that Congress intended to limit
lawsuits that implicate the USPS to
those that meet the criteria of the
FTCA.' 7 Importantly, the FTCA
provides the only way by which an
agency of the federal government may
be sued, regardless of whether that
agency's charter contains a "sue or be
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sued" proviso. 8 As a result, the USPS
urged the court to restrict tort claims
under the FTCA to encompass only
state law torts. Thus, the USPS argued,
because Lanham Act claims are federal
law claims, they should be barred by
the PRA's incorporation of the FTCA. 19
According to the USPS, no federal tort
lawsuits can be initiated against a
federal agency under the FTCA.
Before 1994, three circuits accepted
USPS's theory that federal suits against
the USPS were precluded due to the
FTCA's limited scope. 2° However, since
the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer,2' tort suits may be initiated
against a federal agency when
Congress has equipped that agency
with the "sue or be sued" proviso.
Meyer held that the FTCA does not
preclude lawsuits against federal
instrumentalities which have been
"congressionally invested with the
power to sue and be sued in their own
' 22

names."

At present, the USPS emphasized
the PRA, which states in pertinent part:
"[the FTCA] shall apply to tort claims
arising out of the activities of the Postal
Service.1 23 The USPS attempted to
distinguish Meyer by theorizing that,
unless §409(c) reflected Congress's
intention to limit tort lawsuits against
the USPS to state law tort claims, that
clause is rendered null.24 This is due to
the fact that Congress legislated in the
FTCA 25 a "blanket rule that any state
law tort pressed against any arm of the
federal government, including an
agency such as the USPS invested with
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legislative authorization to 'sue or be
sued,' must be initiated according to
the FTCA."

26

Since the Meyer decision, however,
two circuits have rejected the USPS's
theory that no federal tort law claim
may be asserted against it. Analogously,
no circuits have accepted this theory.
The Fourth Circuit, in Global Mail Ltd.
v. U.S. Postal Svs., 27 held that §409(c)
does not limit the PRA's surrender of
sovereign immunity, so that the USPS
is liable for only those torts
encompassed by the FTCA.28 The
Eighth Circuit similarly dismissed the
USPS's identical argument in U.S. v. Q
Int'l Courier,Inc. 2 9 by stating,
A more logical reading of 39
U.S.C. §409(c) is that the Federal
Tort Claims Act provides the only
remedy against the Postal Service
for torts to which the Federal Tort
Claims Act by its own terms
applies in the first place. Nothing
in §409(c) suggests that it intended
to forbid recovery against the
Postal Service for tort claims that
are beyond the reach of the
Federal Torts Claims Act. 0
The Sixth Circuit followed the rules
of statutory construction in rejecting
the USPS's argument. First, the Court
literally construed the statute "to
accord meaning and effect to each of its
provisions." 31 Thus, when §409(c)
states that the FTCA applies to "tort
claims arising out of the activities of
the Postal Service," it means that all
federal law torts not governed by the
FTCA may be initiated against a
federal instrumentality. Hence, federal
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law torts can be asserted against the
USPS, "in its own name under the
global 'sue and be sued' stipulation of
the PRA. 32 Second, the court adopted
the presumption that Congress meant
what it legislated in the statute.33 As a
result, the Sixth Circuit held that, in the
absence of congressional intent to limit
the expansive divestment of postal
immunity, the type of lawsuits that
may be asserted against the USPS are
not limited to FTCA-type suits.34
Not surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit
adopted the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits' analyses. Essentially, the
holding in Meyer persuaded the Sixth
Circuit that federal tort law claims may
be asserted against the USPS due to the
"sue and be sued" proviso. The court
ultimately found that the application of
the FTCA to the USPS will only occur
in lawsuits of state law tort causes
against the United States.
Sixth Circuit Finds USPS a
Lanham Act "Person"
Arguing in the alternative, the USPS
claimed that, because it was not a
"person" under the Lanham Act,
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
it. 35 The USPS focused on the definition
of "person" within the Lanham Act,
which states that it includes a juristic
person as well as a natural person. The
term "juristic person" includes a firm,
corporation, union, association, or
other organization capable of suing
and being sued in a court of law."36 In
1992, Congress added to the meaning
of "person" to included state actors:
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"the term 'any person' includes any
State, instrumentality of any State or
employee of a State or instrumentality
of a State acting in his or her official
capacity. Any State, and any such
instrumentality, officer, or employee,
shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter in the same manner and to the
same extent as any nongovernmental
37
entity."
However, the USPS contended that
it was not a Lanham Act "person"
because 15 U.S.C. § 1127 only
enumerated private entities, and 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(2) lists only state
governments and employees. 3 The
USPS invoked the "interpretive canon
of ejusdem generis, which posits that 'a
general term following a list of
particulars [should] be interpreted as a
reference to subjects akin to those
specifically enumerated.' 39 The USPS
argued that because "person" included
private parties and state government
instrumentalities, Congress implicitly
excluded all United States governmental
entities. This included the USPS, even
though it had waived its sovereign
immunity. The USPS relied on Preferred
Risk, which explained that the Act does
not classify divisions of the federal
government that have not surrendered
their sovereign immunity as Lanham
"persons.' 0
No court has accepted the proposition
that the USPS is not a Lanham Act
"person." The Eighth Circuit rejected
the USPS's position when it
distinguished its Preferred Risk notes
by pointing out that "Congress
bestowed that status upon the USPS by
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when they equipped the USPS with the
"sue and be sued" language."41 The
Fourth Circuit in Global Mail also found
the USPS a person within the meaning
of a "person" under the Lanham Act.
The Fourth Circuit classified the USPS
and all other federal agencies, which
have waived their immunity and are
capable of suing and being sued, as
"juristic persons. ' 42 Further, the Fourth
Circuit could not distinguish the USPS,
as a government entity involved in
commercial enterprise, from other
private firms or associations.43 Using
these holdings as guidance, the Sixth
Circuit thus held that agencies that
have waived their sovereign immunity
are "juristic persons" and thus may be
sued under the Lanham Act. 44
Conclusion
In sum, the Sixth Circuit's position
that federal courts had jurisdiction
over the USPS arose for two reasons:
(1) the PRA's incorporation of the
FTCA did not preclude tort suits
against the Postal Service; and (2) the
USPS was a Lanham Act "person."
Because of these very propositions, the
USPS was not immune from a false
advertising claim under the Lanham
Act. The Court summarily rejected the
USPS's attempt to take advantage of
the benefits and protections afforded
by the law while simultaneously
avoiding the burdens imposed by the
laws which constrain others. Further,
the Court admonished the USPS's
aggressive market participation and
then "hastily elevatling] the shield of
governmental privilege when accused
1998

of competitive wrongdoing, by
demanding insulation from the legal
consequences of its alleged false and
misleading public broadcasts" which
have allegedly damaged the "financial
interests of both a private sector
competitor and the consuming public."45
Put concisely by Judge Krupansky,
Congress never intended to "launch
USPS into the commercial world and
also to immunize USPS from liability
for federally-created commercial torts
46
such as the Lanham Act.
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